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COPYRIGHT-CATV AND Tm SCOPE OF "PERFORMANC,"-rFort-
nightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
United Artists Television, respondent, was the owner of copyrighted
motion picture films which were licensed for broadcast to five in-
dependent television stations. Of these stations, three were located in
Pittsburgh, Pa., one in Wheeling, W. Va., and one in Steubenville,
Ohio. The licenses in some cases expressly prohibited the use or
retransmission of the copyrighted films by community antenna
systems (CATV). Fortnightly Corp., petitioner, owned two CATV
systems that had subscribers in the Clarksburg and Fairmont, W.
Va. areas. Through the use of sensitive antenna towers tuned for
and directed at a specific station for maximum reception, these sys-
tems picked up the performances of the copyrighted films that were
broadcast by the five stations. The signals received were then retrans-
mitted, after some form of amplification or change in the carrier
wave (channel number/frequency), through coaxial cables to CATV
customers for a monthly service charge. All signals (program content)
received, both copyrighted and non-copyrighted, were retransmitted
to the customers without change. Fortnightly did not originate any
programming nor did it substitute its own advertising. The use of a
CATV system was necessary for acceptable television reception in
the two areas because there were no local stations (at the time of the
original suit) and because mountainous terrain blocked the signals
from the five stations.
United Artists instituted and won a copyright infringement
action against Fortnightly in the District Court, which was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.1 Both courts held that Fortnightly had
made a "public performance" of the copyrighted films as protected
by sections 1 (c) and (d) of the Copyright Act.2 However, the trial
court used a mechanical "electronic reproduction and transmission"
test to define the statutory words "to perform,"3 while the Court
of Appeals placing great reliance on Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty
Co.,4 decided that there had been a performance on the ground that
1 United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177, 198-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), af'd 377 F.2d 872, 879-80 (2d Cir. 1967).
2 17 U.S.C. §§ l(c) and (d) (1964) reads:
Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with provisions of this
title, shall have the exclusive right:
(c) . . . [to] perform it in public for profit....
(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly....
3 255 F. Supp. at 197-98.
4 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
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the CATV system had made a substantial contribution to the viewing
and hearing of the copyrighted works. 5
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, surprisingly,6 re-
versed on the ground that CATV does not "perform" within the
purview of sections 1 (c) and (d) of the Copyright Act by receiving
and carrying the copyrighted programs to their customers. Mr. Justice
Stewart, utilizing a functional test that divides the participants in a
public performance into two groups, exhibitors and audiences (or
broadcasters and viewers), decided that CATV is on the viewer's
side of the line since it is merely an extension of the viewer's antenna,
i.e., functionally it does no more than enhance the viewer's capacity
to receive the broadcaster's signals.7
The Federal Communications Commission licenses television
broadcasting stations and their power output partially on the basis
of the station's B contour, an area in which reception acceptable to
the median observer is theoretically expected to be available 90 per
cent of the time at the best 50 per cent of the locations, Copyright
licenses are usually based upon the number of potential viewers
either within this B contour or actually within reception range. In
this case the surveys conducted to determine the number of viewers
within a station's actual viewing audience included CATV sub-
scribers, who could receive that particular station by cable hook-up.9
Although such retransmission was prohibited by the broadcasters'
licenses, the actual practice of the licensor was to charge the television
stations on a basis that included CATV subscribers (the television
station in turn charged the sponsoring advertisers on the same
basis). Fortnightly offered to prove that this was the situation with
regard to the licenses in question.10
5 377 F.2d at 879; see 377 F.2d at 879-80 n.9, where the court said "... our decision
would be unchanged if defendant's systems had made no use of amplifiers... ." The
court also stated that the facts of this case were stronger than those in Buck. Id. at
878.
6 See, e.g., 69rH AN'uAL REPORT OF T=E REJSTER Or CoPYSnGirr 8 (1967):
The decision of the [district] court, expressed in one of the most compre-
hensive, detailed, and carefully reasoned opinions ever issued in the copyright
field....
7 392 U.S. at 398-99; accord, Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v.
Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 315, 327 (D. Idaho 1961).
8 Sixth Report and Order, Television Allocations, 17 FED. REc. 3905, 3915 (1952);
1 (part 3) P. & F. RADIo REG. 91:601, 91:630 (1952).
9 Brief for Petitioner at 91 n.118, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television,
Inc. 892 US. 390 (1968).
-0 377 F.2d at 881. This was dealt with on appeal as follows:
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CATV systems originally operated within or near the borders
of such B contours. However, CATV has now attempted to carry
programs from a distant station into the non-overlapping B contour
of a local station. The effect is not only to supplement the broadcast
coverage of the distant station but was also to make CATV a direct
competitor of the local station within whose B contour the CATV
system is located.11 This occurred in Fortnightly when a local station
began operating after the original suit was filed.12 This retransmis-
sion into another area meant the loss of a potential market (the local
licensee) for the copyright owner.13
The threat of this expanded mode of operation by the CATV
systems was met by the broadcasting industry (and related interests)
in several ways. One method was to institute an unfair competition
suit for misappropriation of their copyrighted works. In Cable Vision,
Inc. v. KUTV, Inc.,14 the court held that Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co.15 and Compco Corp. v. Day-brite Lighting, Inc.10 were
applicable, with the result that the broadcasters cannot use the Int'l
News Service v. Associated Press7 misappropriation doctrine to en-
join CATV's use of their broadcast signals. On the other hand, the
industry has finally persuaded the FCC to assume regulatory au-
thority over CATV.18 The FCC actions in this direction were re-
cently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. South-
western Cable Co.19 A third mode of attack against CATV has been
through lobbying efforts to have legislation enacted that would
Since this offer of proof was rejected, we shall assume its accuracy, although
it seems debatable, at least so far as the royalties were based upon revenues
from local advertisers.
11 Comment, CATV Regulation-A Complex Problem of Regulatory Jurisdiction, 9
B.C. ImN. & Com. L. Rnv. 429, 429-30 (1968).
12 377 F.2d at 883 (Fairmont is within four B contours and Clarksburg Is within
one B contour of the five stations).
1 377 F.2d at 878. See, Nummm, CoPYMa" § 107.31 (1968).
14 335 F.2d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 989 (1965).
15 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
16 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
17 248 US. 215 (1918).
18 Second Report and Order, Community Antenna Television Systems, 81 FED. RaG.
4540 (1966), 6 P. & F. RADio REG. 2d 1717 (1966) (carriage rules).
19 392 U.S. 157, 88 S. Ct. 1994 (1968). See also, Note, CATV and Copyright
Liability, 80 HAsv. L. Rv. 1514, 1532 (1967), where it is stated that
[i]n a fast-changing field which involves many considerations besides
protecting copyright property, it would appear wiser to continue to rely on
FCC regulations which can be changed as needs require rather than impose
judicially a rigid rule of general CATV copyright liability.
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specifically make CATV liable for copyright infringement. 0 This
proposal, however, has been cut from the proposed copyright re-
vision.21 Finally, the industry has attempted to control CATV
through copyright infringement actions.22 The fIortnightly decision
brings this attempt to an abrupt halt.
In construing the Copyright Act, it has been held that a broad-
cast is a performance3 and that it is a public performance even if
the audience is not assembled, e.g., the audience listens in many
private homes..2 4 On the other hand, not only do those who take sig-
nals from the air not perform, but the transmission of these signals
is also not a performance. 5 The Debaum case went so far as to say
that there was an implied license to anyone receiving the authorized
broadcast to use it in any manner, and that there was a release of the
statutory monopoly by the copyright owner for that particular
licensed broadcast.26
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.27 introduced the multiple
performance doctrine. In this case the broadcast by the radio station
was unlicensed. The co-defendant hotel received the broadcast of the
phonograph record over its master radio and played the copyrighted
work through loud speakers throughout the hotel. Both the broad-
caster and the hotel were held liable as infringers. The court first
noted that there was nothing in the Copyright Act that would pre-
vent more than one performance in the instance where there was a
single rendition (i.e., multiple performance). The court then decided
that the process of receiving a radio broadcast and then transducing
it into audible sound is different from merely hearing the original
music, and reasoned that this electronic reproduction was such a
performance as contemplated by the Copyright Act. The court also
20 H.R. 2512 § iii, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
21 113 CONG. REic. 3857-59 (daily ed. April 11, 1967).
22 69TH ANNUAL REPORT OF Tm REGLSrr OF CoPYRIcHT 10 (1967):
[Columbia Broadcasting System v. Teleprompter Corp., 251 F. Supp. 302
(S.N.Y. 1965)] . . . is also a test case and one of the battles in a war between
the television broadcasting industry on the one hand and the CATV s)stem
operators on the other.
See 80 HAxv. L. Rv., supra note 19, at 1514.
23 Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411, 412
(6th Cir. 1925).
24 Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co., 16 F.2d 829 (S3D.N.Y. 1926).
25 Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1929). E.g., Transmission by Com-
munications common carriers from networks to broadcasting stations.
26 Id. at 735.
27 283 US. 191 (1931).
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stated that "public reception for profit in itself constitutes an in-
fringement" of the copyright owner's exclusive right to perform.28
Buck was followed by SESAC v. N.Y. Hotel Statler Co.,20 a case
in which the only factual distinctions from Buck were that the broad-
cast by the radio station was licensed, the speakers were located only
in the private guest rooms of the hotel, and the guests could select
between two stations. This was held to be a performance within the
Buck definition. The court stated that the guest's control over the
speaker had no more effect on "performance" than a radio listener's
control over his set derogated from the original public performance
by the broadcaster.
After comparing the operation of a CATV system with the hotel
operation in SESAC and with a hotel that supplies a receiving set
in each guestroom that is wired to a master antenna,80 it becomes
apparent that a viable or logical distinction cannot be made. Yet
without explicitly disapproving them, the Supreme Court in Fort-
nightly chose not to follow Buck and SESA C. Actual business prac-
tice probably supplies the rationale for this part of the Court's
decision since the Buck doctrine has never been applied to its logical
extreme by the two major performing right societies, ASCAP and
BMI, in that they do not demand performing licenses from commer-
cial establishments such as bars and restaurants which operate radio
or TV sets for the amusement of their customers. However, such
demands are made of hotels which operate in the manner of the
LaSalle Hotel.31 Mr. Justice Stewart noted that,
The [Buck] decision must be understood as limited to its
own facts .... 32
[E]xisting "business relationships" would hardly be p reserved
by extending a questionable 35-year-old decision that in actual
practice has not been applied outside its own factual context...
so as retroactively to impose copyright liability where it has never
been acknowledged to exist before.33
Apparently the Court felt a hotel should not be liable but did not
overrule Buck in order to preserve business practices.
28 Id. at 198-201.
29 Society of European Stage Authors & Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statlcr
Co., 19 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
so NirmaR, COPYRIGHT § 107.42, at 412 (1968). (No copyright liability in such a
case).
31 Id. § 107.41, at 410 n.204.
32 892 U.S. at 896-97 n.18.
33 Id. at 401 n.80.
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Mr. Justice Stewart's statement that "petitioner's systems did
not 'perform' the respondent's copyrighted works in any con-
ventional sense of that term, or in any manner envisaged by the
Congress that enacted the law in 1909"-' 4 could readily be applied to
the Buck and SESAC cases. He also rejected the quantitative analysis
that was used by the lower court as a test for the determination of
copyright liability. In terms of television broadcasting, such a defini-
tion would have included even apartment house antenna owners
and television manufacturers within the infringer group. 5 The dis-
sent agreed that the Buck interpretation was not altogether satis-
factory as an analytical matter. Mr. Justice Fortas read the Buck
case as holding that the use of reproductive equipment to extend a
broadcast to a significantly wider public than the broadcast would
otherwise enjoy constitutes a "performance" and therefore it makes
no difference whether the original performance was licensed or not. 6
Buck and SESA C are still relevant, however, for the proposition that
utilization of broadcast signals for commercial purposes is deemed
a copyright infringement.3 7
The majority opinion divides the participants in a performance
(in the area of broadcasting) into broadcasters who perform and
viewers who do not perform. Since the basic function of CATV is
little different from that function served by antenna equipment
generally furnished by a TV viewer, CATV falls on the viewer side
of the line. This is a crucial difference: the exclusive right is to the
performance and not the viewing. Therefore, any viewing of a per-
formance is outside the protection granted by the statute. Justice
Fortas stated that the majority had placed one "outmoded interpreta-
tion" with a rule which he did not believe was an intelligible guide
for the construction of the Copyright Act. He believed "[t]he issue
here is whether, for this use, the owner of copyrighted material should
be compensated."38 Justice Stewart gave this little weight when he
said that the only difference between CATV and an owner's antenna
was that the former was owned by an entrepreneur.
The primary policy of the copyright law is to make available
to the public the benefits of authors' works. This is accomplished by
34 Id. at 595.
35 B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VMViv OF COPYRIGHT 104-05 (1967).
36 392 U.S. at 405-06.
37 Hunke, Community Antenna Television Operations as a "Performance": An
Application of the Principle of Semantic Extention to the Federal Copyright Act, 44
N. DAx. L. Rxv. 17,40 (1967).
38 392 US. at 403.
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granting to these authors certain exclusive rights in the use of these
works.3 9 The Statute of Anne, in which Parliament vested only
certain limited rights while ending the unlimited common law
property rights, divided the economic benefits resulting from such
use between the author and the booksellers (copyright owners).40
In Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons the court analyzed
the congressional purpose in creating a renewal term, granted only
to the author, as an attempt by Congress to divide the profits between
the author and the copyright proprietor (assignee).41 Even the doc-
trine of fair use is based on whether the unauthorized use diminishes
the possibility of economic gain which should accrue to the copyright
owner.
42
The Court's functional rule does not consider these economic
aspects of the case.43 Nevertheless, on the facts of this case, the out-
come is correct because the CATV subscribers were included in the
survey that was used to compute the compensation for the copyright
proprietor, even though the licenses nominally prohibited retrans-
mission by CATV systems.
However, the rule announced by Justice Stewart causes problems
when CATV carries programs out of the area for which the copyright
owner is compensated (he is, therefore, not compensated and loses a
future market), or when a hotel or bar uses the program as an attrac-
tion to enable it to get more customers and the resulting profit is not
shared with the copyright owner, or when a TV station refuses to
agree to or pay a license fee that includes CATV subscribers, but still
charges advertising on a basis that includes CATV subscribers.
Using this new rule there is a question as to whether translator and
39 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); KAPLAN, supra note 35 at 75 (Copyright
has evidently more to do today with mobilizing the profit-propelled apparatus of dis-
semination); NiMMER, COPYRIGHT, § 3.1, at 4:
Implicit in this rational is the assumption that in the absence of such
public benefit the grant of a copyright monopoly to individuals would be
unjustified.
40 Morris, The Origins of the Statute of Anne, 12 ASCAP CoPYrIorr LAw Sym-
posium 222, 258 (1963).
41 318 U.S. 643, 648 (1943) (our copyright laws were based largely on the Statute
of Anne); see KAPLAN, supra note 35, at 112.
42 N IMER, COPYRIGHT, § 145, at 646:
[Doctrine of fair use] can best be explained by looking to the central
question of whether the defendant's work tends to diminish or prejudice the
potential sale of the plaintiff's work.
See KAPLAN, supra note 35, at 67.
43 36 GEo. WAsH. L. Rxv. 672, 674 (1968) (suggestion that a good test should Include
the market element); Both broadcasters and CATV operators profit through the use
of the copyrighted films.
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satellite stations should not be considered as free from copyright
liability.
The idea that the operation of CATV is based upon the use of
other people's property" can be conceptualized as an unfair trade or
misappropriation doctrine instead of a copyright doctrine. If the
result in the Buck case actually stems from this idea that it was a
wrongful use of another's property or that the hotel was benefiting
from another's efforts at no cost to itself, then Forlnightly ends the
Buck doctrine in a manner analogous to the way Sears and Compco
isolated the INS misappropriation doctrine. 5
In this respect Fortnightly represents a proper exercise of judi-
cial power. The Copyright Act does not give the courts power to
act in this preempted area except under the enumerated rights. 4A But
the courts have had a tendency to fill out the interstices of the copy-
right law when its protection is inadequate (as indicated by both
majority and dissent) and when they feel that someone's property
has been taken. 47 In the past the courts have yielded to this desire
and have given additional protection through use of state law to
determine when there is a publication and resulting release of com-
mon law copyright protection,48 through use of the misappropriation
doctrine,49 and through the enlargement of the scope of the copy-
right law by broadly construing the term "to perform."'5 The Sears
and Compco cases have curtailed the former two means of avoiding
the harshness of the Copyright Act while Fortnightly has had the
same effect on the latter. These three cases are consistent with Judge
44 392 U.S. at 403; cf., Hunke, supra note 37, at 47:
This position [that CATV is taking a property right] assumes, of course,
that the copyright statute should grant an unlimited rather than a limited
property right which is really the central issue.
45 KAP .N, supra note 35, at 90:
Strictly, INS was now a stray .... but it was a handy citation for state
judges....
46 But cf., Comment, Copyright Pre-emption and Character Values: The Paladin
Case as an Extension of Sears and Compco, 66 Mic. L. REv. 1018, 1030 (1968); KAPLAN,
supra note 35, at 40.
47 Price, The Moral Judge and the Copyright Statute: The Problem of Stiffel and
Compco, 14 ASCAP COPYRiGHT LAW Symosium 90, 102-03 (1966); 66 Mimi. L. REV.
supra note 46, at 1030,
i]he whole trend toward greater use of copyright-related doctrines may
be viewed as a creative and commendable judicial response to the inadequacies
of the federal Act....
48 Eq., Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 835 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1964).
49 Int'l News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
50 Buck v. Jewell-LaSa~le Realty Co., 283 US. 191 (1931).
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Hand's earlier attempts51 to reject judicial power that goes beyond
the Copyright Act.52
Fortnightly has not advanced or broadened the copyright law,
but at the same time it has probably come closer to the true meaning
of the phrase "to perform." It is clear that the Copyright Act is in-
adequate53 and that this decision does not attempt to repair this
inadequacy. This is a job for Congress and the Court wisely left it as
such,54 since the policy of the Act has become almost impossible to
apply in this age of CATV, high speed copiers, and satellite relays.
A copyright monopoly should result only from a specific legislative
grant. The Court in Southwestern Cable protected the copyright
owners' interests through FCC regulation, while in Fortnightly the
Court protected the public interest of free access to released mate-
rials. Further reconciliation of these two interests should be left to
Congress.55
EVIDENCE-ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE-AsSERTION By CORPORA-
TION NOT A BAR TO DISCOVERY By STOCKIOLDERS-Garner v. Wolfin-
barger, 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968), appeal docketed, No. ,
(5th Cir. 1968).-Garner and other stockholders of the First
American Life Insurance Company brought a class action seeking
damages for alleged violations of the federal securities acts, and the
Securities Act of Alabama.1 By a subpoena duces tecum which was
treated as a motion to produce, the court ordered the corporation
to produce certain documents pertaining to the matters in contro-
51 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir. 1955)
(dissenting opinion); G. Recordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952); R.C.A.
Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
52 Price, supra note 47, at 102-05.
53 Id. at 118:
But there is the nagging feeling that the reason for nonprotection isn't
a careful balancing on the part of Congress; rather, it is the inability of the
legislators to resolve incredibly difficult problems which strike at the heart
of copyright structure.
54 892 U.S. at 401; contra, Price, supra note 47 at 114, 115.
55 See Gold, Television Broadcasting and Copyright Law: The Community Antenna
Television Controversy, 16 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAw SMymosium 170, 191-192 (1968).
1 Petitioner-Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Petition For Interlocutory
Appeal at 1, Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968), appeal docketed,
No. -, (5th Cir. 1968).
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versy.2 The corporation did not produce the documents. On the taking
of his deposition, R. Richard Schweitzer, president of First American
Life Insurance, asserted a claim of privilege with respect to commu-
nications with company attorneys, and accordingly refused to re-
spond to certain questions. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved the court
to order production of the documents and answers to the oral inter-
rogatories presented to Schweitzer. The point at issue on the motions
was whether communications prior to the filing of the suit betveen
the corporations and its attorneys3 were privileged as to the com-
plaining stockholders.
In a short opinion citing only two English cases, 4 the court ruled
that the stockholders were entitled to discovery of the communica-
tions. 5 Both English cases relied to a large extent upon principles
of trusts, and stressed the directors' status as fiduciaries for the cor-
porate stockholders." By resting its decision upon the right of the
2 The precise nature of the documents in question is not dear. The court used
the terms "documents" and "communications." 280 F. Supp. at 1019. Clearly the subject
matter under dispute involves communications between the defendant corporation and
its attorneys.
3 Schweitzer became president of First American after the suit was filed. Prior
to that time, he was one of the attorneys for First American, and at least part of the
communications in question had taken place between Schweitzer as an attorney and
First American. Id. However, although mentioned by the court, this dual role does
not appear to have any relevance to the decision.
4 Gouraud v. Edison Gower Bell Tel. Co. of Europe, 57 L.J. Ch. 498 (1888); Dennis
and Sons v. West Norfolk Farmers' Co., [1943] 2 All E.R. 94 (Ch.). In Gouraud, plain.
tiff stockholder sued to set aside an agreement between the defendant directors and
another corporation. The court held that advisory documents obtained from corporate
attorneys with the plaintiff's money may not be withheld. In Dennis and Sons, plaintiff
stockholder and defendant director disagreed over the proper construction of an article
in the charter granting annual rebates to stockholders from earnings. The directors
employed a firm of accountants to construe the article regulating the rebate, and the
court held that the accountant's report was not privileged.
5 280 F. Supp. at 1019.
o In Gouraud the court stated, "[O]n the general principle that obtains in partner-
ship actions, and also in actions by a cestui que trust against a trustee-namely, that a
party cannot resist production of documents which have been obtained by means of
payment from the moneys belonging to the party applying for their production." 57
L.J. Ch. at 499, 500. In Dennis and Sons, the court applied the rule that a cestui que
trust is entitled to see cases and opinions submitted and taken by the trustee, unless
the trustee takes the opinion for his own defense in an action by the cestul. [1943]
2 All E.R. at 96. But see, Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Cor-
poration Law, 69 HAv. L. Rzv. 1369, 1380 (1956), where it is indicated that a British
stockholder as such has no right to inspect corporate books and records; see Butt v.
Kelson, [1952] Ch. 197 (CL 1951) which indicates that the British courts will look to
the articles of association to determine the extent of a shareholder's right to inspection.
1968] 1047
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
stockholder to inspect the books and records of the corporation, the
court incidentally raises some ancillary issues, 7 but more significantly,
it jeopardizes the right of the corporation to assert the attorney-client
privilege, contrary to the assurance of Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
American Gas Ass'n.8
Communications between a corporation and its attorneys are
eligible for the attorney-client privilege in federal courts by virtue
of the evidentiary exclusion contained in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 9 Although the right of the corporation to exercise the
attorney-client privilege has apparently never been challenged in the
Alabama courts, there is no reason to believe that this right would be
denied.' 0 Consideration of the philosophy underlying the attorney-
7 It is generally accepted that a stockholder has a right either under common law
or by virtue of state statute to inspect the books and records of the corporation.
Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 153 (1905); 5 W. FLz-rcnER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 2213 (Perm. ed. 1967); ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21(46) (Supp. 1967). Under § 21(46) of tile
Alabama Business Corporations Act, a fine is imposed upon any officer or agent who
without reasonable cause, refuses to allow the stockholder to inspect the books and
records for any proper purpose. If as in the present case, a court in construing the
scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes that the
stockholder's rights of inspection are more extensive than those of the ordinary
litigant, the following issues are raised: a) Should the court consider all the elements,
such as burden of proof and proper purpose, which are part of the common law or
state created right? b) Is this decision the equivalent of a holding that the stockholder
has been wrongfully denied his rights of inspection? If so, wouldn't the decision be
res judicata for a suit brought by the stockholder to collect his statutory fine? If a
fine is to be imposed upon the officer or agent, is the officer or agent entitled to a jury
trial on the issues of proper purpose and burden of proof? See generally ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 32, § 157.45 (Smith-Hurd 1954); McGregor v. Thor Power Tool Co., 72 Il1.
App. 2d 24, 217 N.E.2d 822 (1966).
S 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'g 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. 111. 1962), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963). Prior to the district court decision in Radiant Burners, It was
generally assumed that corporations were entitled to the attorney-client privilege, Simon,
The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YA LJ. 958 (1956).
9 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b), 34. "Privileged" as it is used in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure refers to privileges recognized by the law of evidence, United States v.
Reynolds, 345 US. 1, 6 (1958). In the principal case production was sought by way of
a subpoena duces tecum, but the subpoena duces tecum cannot overcome a claim of
privilege, NLRB v. Harvey, 264 F. Supp. 770, 772-73 (W.D. Va. 1966); 5 J. Mooax,
FEDERAL PRA TicE 4 5.05[l] at 1721 (2d ed. 1968).
10 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 438 (1958) codifies the attorney-client privilege, but it has been
held to be merely a statement on privilege as applied by the courts, Ex parte Enzor,
270 Ala. 254, 256, 117 So. 2d 361, 362 (1960). The attorney-client privilege for corpora.
tions has apparently never been challenged in Alabama, but in Melco System v. Re.
ceivers of Trans-American Ins. Co., 268 Ala. 152, 163, 105 So. 2d 43, 52 (1958), the
receivers of the corporation were allowed to assert the privilege against creditors. In
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client privilege indicates no basis for distinguishing the corporate
client from any other client. The purpose of the privilege is to facili-
tate the workings of our legal system by encouraging the client to
confide in his attorney and thus arguably to promote truth find-
ing. In this respect it is distinguishable from other evidentiary privi-
leges which are based upon respect for individual rights in spite of
the fact that they hinder truth finding n Since disclosure to the attor-
ney is the protected value, it is immaterial whether or not the corpo-
ration may exercise personal rights.'-
If the corporation is entitled to assert the attorney-client privi-
lege, it may be assumed that the documents challenged in Garner v.
Wolfinbarger were privileged,13 in the absence of a condition destroy-
ing the privilege. One rationale for the court's decision may be that
the relationship between the stockholder and the corporate director
operates to so destroy it.
For purposes of the attorney-client privilege, a client may consist
of more than one person under certain circumstances, primarily
where several persons have a common interest in a transaction or a
business unit. Communications between an attorney and a member
of the group having the common interest may be privileged from
discovery by a third party, not a member of the common interest
group. The problem arises when two members of the common
interest group become involved in litigation with each other concern-
Parish v. Gates, 29 Ala. 254, 259 (1856) the court said, "There is, perhaps, no principle
of law which rests on a sounder basis, or which is supported by a more uniform chain
of adjudication, than that which holds all information acquired by an attorney from
his client, touching matters that come within the ordinary scope of professional
employment, as privileged communications."
11 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir. 1963),
rev'g 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. MII. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); American
Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 88 n.12 (D. Del. 1962); Sympo-
sium-the Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, 56 Nw. U.L. Rzv.
235, 241 (1961).
12 The constitutional privilege against self-discrimination has been denied to cor-
porations because of their impersonal nature. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699
(1944).
13 The mere fact of a legal consultation is prima fade the establishment of the
professional relationship, 8 WMoRE, EvmxNacE § 2296 (McNaughten Rev. 1961). Wig-
more describes the attorney-client privilege:
Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal advisor in
his capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, made in
confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from dis-
closure by himself or by the legal advisor, except the protection may be waived.
8 W Vmo E, EvmENcE § 2292 (McNaughten Rev. 1961).
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ing the subject of the common interest. When this happens, it is
generally held that the attorney-client privilege may not be used to
prevent discovery by either member, because both had an interest in
the subject of any communications to the attorney. 14
Hence the question is whether both the stockholder and the
director of a corporation are included within the perimeter of the
corporate client, so that one may not invoke the attorney-client privi-
lege against the other, in a situation where the corporate director
communicates with the corporate attorney on a matter for the benefit
of the corporation as a whole. 5 The federal courts have considered
the question of who is the corporate client. 0 Generally the problem
arises in a context in which the corporation is asserting that an
employee is the client and that a statement from that employee to
the corporate attorneys is privileged. In Hickman v. Taylor,17 the
Supreme Court seems to have eliminated the notion that statements
from employees are automatically privileged.' 8 This lead was followed
14 [W]hen the same attorney acts for two parties having a common interest
and each party communicates with him .. . [t]he communications are clearly
privileged from disclosure at the instance of a third person. Yet they are not
privileged in a controversy between the two original parties....
8 Wicaosm, EvmDNcE § 2312, at 603-04 (McNaughten Rev. 1961).
See In re Bourne, 38 Misc. 2d 838, 238 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1963).
'5 Simon, The Attorney Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J.
953, 968 (1956), comments in passing that the stockholders might be entitled to inspect
opinions of counsel along with other corporate records.
16 There is some question as to whether or not a federal court is bound by state
law in applying privileges, especially in diversity cases. Ortiz v. H. L. H. Products,
39 F.R.D. 41, 43-44 (D. Del. 1965), cites cases going both ways but concludes that the
privilege is a matter of procedural law; accord, Belback v. Wilson Freight Forwarding,
40 F.R.D. 16 (W.D. Pa. 1966); Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery, 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D.
Ohio 1953). Professor Moore indicates that the general frame of reference must be state
law, but that the federal courts should have a measure of latitude in deciding for
themselves whether a matter is privileged. 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PaAcrca I 26[23[9], at
1482-84 (2d Ed. 1968). Several factors point to federal procedural law in the principal
case: (a) the plaintiff has a federal cause of action; (b) neither the Fifth Circuit nor
the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama consider themselves bound by
state law on evidence, Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 410 (5th Cir. 1960);
Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351, 353 (N.D. Ala. 1953); (c) the specific evidentiary
problem has never been raised in Alabama so there is no state case law, see note 10
supra and accompanying text.
17 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
18 Id. at 508. However this statement and the inferences therefrom could be
considered dictum. Cf. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357




in Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation19 which held
that if a statement from an employee is to be privileged, the employee
making the statement must be in a position to take a substantial part
in the decision which the corporation would make after receiving
advice from the attorney; the employee must be a member of the
"control group."-'
Presumably, the same approach would be followed even though
the litigation were between the corporation and one of its employees.
The employee would not automatically be excluded or included in
the group that is called the corporate client; rather, an investigation
would be undertaken to determine the employee's specific relation
to the litigation. By analogy, it would seem inconsistent to adopt the
view that stockholders as a class are automatically included within
the term corporate client, and that therefore the stockholder and the
corporate director are common clients of the corporate attorneys.
An alernative rationale for the decision in Garner v. Wolfin-
barger is that the inspection rights of the stockholder supercede the
attorney-client privilege.2 1 Regardless of the terminology that is used
to describe the relationship between the stockholder and the corpora-
tion, the stockholders have a clear common law or statutory right to
examine the books, papers and records of the corporation.2 In the
present case, the applicable statute is § 21(46) of the Alabama Busi-
ness Corporation Act.2 3 In delineating the scope of the stockholder's
right to inspect, the statute uses the words "books and records of
account, minutes, and records of stockholders."24 A predecessor of
§ 21(46)25 used the terms "books, records, and papers" but this lan-
19 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
20 Id. at 485. The "control group" definition has been followed in Natta v. Hogan,
392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968): Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp.
515, 517-18 (S.D. Cal. 1963). Another group of cases starting with Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954), follow what is called a
"document by document" approach, and thus the origin of the document is one of
the factors considered. See also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320
F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
21 It is sometimes said that a privilege is absolute, but if the statement is true, it
has exceptions. See Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d
338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965). An attorney may not advise on the further commission of
a crime and have the statements privileged, Ex parte Enzor, 270 Ala. 254, 260, 117
So. 2d 361, 365 (1960).
22 Authority cited note 7 supra.
23 AiA. CODE tit. 10, § 21(46) (Supp. 1967).
24 Id.
25 Act of July 30, 1931, ch. 274, § 7001(1), [1931] Gen. Acts Ala. 762 (repealed 1959).
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guage in no way limited the stockholder's common law rights of
inspection. 26 In light of its opinion in Smith v. Flynn,2 7 the Supreme
Court of Alabama has apparently not taken the dange in statutory
language to indicate a legislative intent to limit the scope of the
stockholder's rights.
In Smith v. Flynn, the plaintiff stockholder had requested an
inspection of the expense account of the president of the corporation,
but was refused. Thereafter he brought an action for his ten percent
statutory damages, even though he had in the meantime obtained
access to the document. Quoting from Foster v. White,28 the supreme
court stated that the purpose of § 21(46)
[1]s to protect small and minority stockholders against the power
of the majority, and against the mismanagement and faithless-
ness of agents and officers, by furnishing mode and opportunity
to ascertain, establish and maintain their rights, and to intelli-
gently perform their corporate duties .... It was intended to
enlarge ... the right, rendering it consistent and coextensive
with the stockholder's right, as a common owner of the prop-
erty, books and papers of the corporation, and with the duties
and obligations of the managing officers, as agents and trustees. 20
The only limitations to the right of inspection recognized by the
court were that the right shall "be exercised at reasonable and proper
times" and that "it shall not be exercised from idle curiosity, or for
improper or unlawful purposes,"30 with the burden upon the corpo-
rate officer to show that the stockholder's demand was improper, or
that he had reasonable cause to refuse inspection. 81
Notwithstanding the language in Smith v. Flynn, courts in Ala-
bama and in other states recognize that the right of inspection is not
without limit. It is tailored to conform to the circumstances, and thus
one of the considerations is the type of document that is being
sought.32 Stockholder lists are generally treated more liberally by the
28 Loveman v. Tutwiler Inv. Co., 240 Ala. 424, 199 So. 854 (1941).
27 275 Ala. 392, 155 So. 2d 497 (1963).
28 86 Ala. 467, 6 So. 88 (1889).
29 Smith v. Flynn, 275 Ala. 392, 397, 155 So. 2d 497, 501 (1963).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 398, 155 So. 2d at 501.
32 For examples of flexible orders taking account of spedal circumstances see
Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N-E.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.2d
397 (1965); News-Journal Corp. v. State ex rel Gore, 136 Fla. 620, 187 So. 271 (1939). In
State cx rel Jones v. Ralston Purina Co., 358 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1962) the court refused to
allow a stockholder to inspect trial balances and other financial work papers. In Tucson
Gas and Elec. Co. v. Schantz, 5 Ariz. App. 511, 428 P.2d 686 (1967) the stockholder was
allowed to inspect the ballots cast in an election for directors.
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courts than are documents relating to financial matterspas It is Tecog-
nized that the stockholder has his right to inspect only by virtue of
his ownership interest in the corporation, and therefore it is gen-
erally held that the documents he seeks must be in furtherance of
his interest as a stockholder.34 However, in Alabama the fact that the
stockholder is engaged in litigation with the corporation, as in the
present case, does not eliminate his inspection rights or make his
purpose "improper."35 Presumably the stockholder has the same
rights to general corporate information, as distinguished from mate-
rials prepared by the directors for their own defense, after he begins
litigation against the corporation as he had before. 0
Whether privileged documents are within the scope of the stock-
holder's inspection rights is a question that has not been litigated.
Banks sometimes resist the production of records on the grounds that
the information is privileged, but generally unsuccessfully."7 In re-
sponse to a claim that confidential inter-office letters were privileged,
the Supreme Court of Florida indicated that the stockholder is
entitled to any information, including trade secrets and privileged
confidential communications, if the stockholder can show that these
items affect the value of his stock. 8 If the sole criterion for deter-
mining whether a stockholder may inspect is the value of the inspec-
tion to the individual stockholder, it would seem that very few items
could be absolutely immune from inspection.
In conflict with the individual stockholder's interest in inspecting
the books and records of the corporation is the interest of the rest
of the stockholders in having no undue interference with the normal
operating affairs of the corporation. This concept has been embodied
3 Goldman v. Trans-United Indus., 404 Pa. 288, 292, 171 A.2d 788, 791 (1961);
P. Ba M AND W. CARY, CORPO TIONS, CASES AND MATERIlS 733 (3d ed.-unabridged
1959).
34 State ex rel Armour v. Gulf Sulphur Corp., 233 A.2d 457, 462 (Super. Ct. Del.
1967); see Hutson v. Brown, 248 Ala. 215, 26 So. 2d 907 (1946); News-Journal Corp.
v. State ex rel Gore, 136 Fla. 620, 187 So. 271 (1939).
35 Burns v. Drennen, 220 Ala. 404, 405, 125 So. 667, 668-69 (1930).
386 But see Barnett v. Barnett Enterprises, 182 So. 2d 728, 732 (CL App. La. 1966)
which held that a plaintiff stockholder's procedural rights, as to discovery, are limited
by the same provisions as are applicable to any other litigent, pursuant to the state
statutes.
37 Allowing inspection: Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905); Durnin v. Allen.
town Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Pa. 1963); contra, Daurelle v.
Traders Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n, 143 W. Va. 674, 104 S.E.2d 320 (1958).
38 News-Journal Corp. v. State ex rel Gore, 136 Fla. 620, 624, 187 So. 271, 272
(1939).
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in the statement that the right of inspection cannot be exercised for
improper or unlawful purposes, detrimental to the corporation or
the interests of the other stockholders.39 Since every inspection by a
stockholder is more or less a detriment to the corporation, in the
sense that the time of some employee is utilized, the task is to recon-
cile the competing interests with respect to any given document or
type of inspection.40 In Hutson v. Brown,41 the Supreme Court of
Alabama denied a stockholder's request for inspection upon a show-
ing that the stockholder was a competing mortician, and was using
the financial data in an effort to cast doubt upon the financial sta-
bility of the defendant corporation.
Despite the expansive language of the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama in Smith v. Flynn, it expressly retained the requirement that
the right of inspection not be exercised for "improper" purposes.42
The requirement that the purpose of inspection not be improper had
its origin in Alabama with Foster v. White,43 and was used in Hutson
v. Brown44 to deny the right of inspection where the resultant benefit
of inspection was clearly outweighed by the damage to the corpora-
tion and the rest of the stockholders.
The attorney-client privilege is predicated on the assumption
that our legal machinery will run more smoothly if the client is
encouraged to confide fully in his attorney. This is accomplished by
giving the client immunity from any disclosures he makes to his
attorney during the course of seeking legal advice. Under these
premises, it should follow that to the extent the attorney-client privi-
lege is eliminated, the client will be discouraged from confiding in
his attorney. In the context of the present case, any increase in the
stockholder's rights to inspect privileged documents would result in
a decrease in the amount of information conveyed by corporate
management to the corporate attorneys. The question therefore is
whether it is more beneficial to the stockholders to have the right to
inspect all correspondence and documents, or whether their best
interests require that the management of the corporation be encour-
39 Hutson v. Brown, 248 Ala. 215, 216, 26 So. 2d 907 (1946).
40 State ex rel. Armour v. Gulf Sulphur Corp., 233 A.2d 457, 462 (Supcr. Ct. Dcl.
1967). See News-Journal Corp. v. State ex rel Gore, 136 Fla. 620, 623, 187 So. 271, 272
(1939); Electro-Formation, Inc. v. Ergon Research Lab., 284 Mass. 392, 395, 187 N.E.
827, 828 (1933).
41 248 Ala. 215, 26 So. 2d 907 (1946).
42 275 Ala. at 307, 155 So. 2d at 501.
43 86 Ala. 467, 469, 6 So. 88, 89 (1889).
44 248 Ala. 215, 26 So. 2d 907 (1946).
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aged to rely upon corporate counsel. Conceivably, under a given set
of facts, the right to inspect all documents would be more important.
However, the solution should not be determined by merely labeling
the stockholder a beneficiary or the director a trustee. Rather each
case should consider all the circumstances including the harm and
benefit that would result from the production or non-production of
the specific document in question.

